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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
weighted in favor of the amendment as it will prove to be ex-
peditious in the great majority of cases and will relieve the heirs
of the long wait and commerce tieup of property which in but a
small percentage of cases would after all have proved to have
been unnecessary. The result will be like unto the court's appli-
cation of Article 77 in decisions where property accruing to ab-
sentees after their existence became unknown was involved. 9
The safeguards for this situation are found in Articles 78 and 79.10
The question of provisional possession will also be removed when
direct descendants are involved under Article 77.11 *The difficul-
ties of Article 76, reading "Whoever shall claim a right accruing
to a person whose existence is not known, shall be bound to prove
that such person existed at the time when the right in question
accrued, and until this be proved, his demand shall not be ad-
mitted," appear to be unaffected by the amendment. 12
CIVIL PROCEDURE
HENRY G. MCMAHON*
Abatement of Actions. Since 1825 the positive law of Lou-
isiana has provided that "Actions do not abate by the death of
one of the parties after answer filed."' Despite this sweeping
language, it was held in Chivers v. Roger that when a beneficiary
designated by the pertinent code provision" brought an action to
recover damages for wrongful death and died after answer filed,
the right of action was not transmitted to plaintiff's heirs. The
action was held to have abated upon the death of plaintiff. Al-
though the Chivers case has been followed in Louisiana,' the
state courts have never extended the rule beyond the precise
factual limits of the case.5 The probabilities are that the sole
9. Pflster v. Casso, 161 La. 940, 109 So. 770 (1926); Succession of Butler,
166 La. 224, 117 So. 127 (1928).
10. See Dugas v. Powell, 21 So.(2d) 366 (1945).
11. See Succession of Williams, 149 La. 198, 88 So. 791 (1920).
12. See Dolhonde v. Lemoine, 32 La. Ann. 251 (1880).
* Professor of Civil Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Art. 21, La. Codes of Practice of 1825 and 1870.
2. 50 La. Ann. 57, 23 So. 100 (1898).
3. Art. 2315, La. Civil Code of 1870.
4. Hardtner v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 189 So. 365 (La. App. 1939);
Hebert v. United States, 39 F. Supp. 267 (D. C. La. 1941). See also Kerner
v. Trans-Mississippi Terminal R. Co., 158 La. 853, 104 So. 740 (1925).
5. Both before and after the Chvers decision, the supreme court held
that If plaintiff had obtained judgment on his claim for wrongful death, and
died pending defendant's appeal therefrom, the action did not abate. Vincent
v. Sharp, 9 La. Ann. 463 (1854); Castelluccio v. Cloverland Dairy Products
Co., 165 La. 606, 115 So. 796 (1928). To the same effect: Williams v. Camp-
bell, 185 So. 683 (La. App. 1938). In Durbridge v. State, 117 La. 841, 42 So. 337
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purpose of Louisiana Act 239 of 1946 was the legislative overrul-
ing of Chivers v. Roger;6 although there is a possibility that a
greater accomplishment was intended.*
The 1946 act, which expressly is made applicable to pending
as well as subsequent actions, provides "that there are no ex-
ceptions to the rule that an action does not abate by the death
of one of the parties thereto after issue joined." The all-inclusive
language of this legislation will call for an alertness from the
court to avoid absurd consequences in the field of "strictly per-
sonal obligations," s and of rights which are purely personal to a
plaintiff and terminate with the latter's death.9 In certain border-
(1906), where plaintiff was authorized to sue the state to recover on bonds
allegedly issued under unconstitutional statutes, plaintiff died pending his
own appeal from a judgment for defendant, and the court allowed the sub-
stitution of plaintiff's heirs as parties plaintiff, refusing to apply the rule
of the Chivers case. In the latest case on the subject, plaintiff sued out an
appeal from a judgment rejecting his claim for wrongful death, and ob-
tained judgment by a divided court on the appellate court's first hearing.
Plaintiff died pending action on defendant's application for rehearing, and
a divided court held that the action had not abated on plaintiff's death, and
re-instated its original decree to the extent of awarding judgment to plain-
tiff's heirs. Foy v. Little, 197 So. 313 (La. App. 1939) noted in (1940) 15 Tu-
lane L. Rev. 135.
6. In the field where the greatest application of the rule might be ex-
pected, actions for wrongful death, the Chivers case "represents the only
set of circumstances under which an action in Louisiana abates with the
death of the plaintiff after answer filed." Oppenheim, The Survival of Tort
Actions and The Action for Wrongful Death-A Survey and a Proposal
(1941) 16 Tulane L. Rev. 386, 412; Voss, The Recovery of Damages for
Wrongful Death at Common Law, at Civil Law, and in Louisiana (1932) 6
Tulane L. Rev. 201, 233.
7. Chivers v. Roger, 50 La. Ann. 57, 23 So. 100 (1898), was relied on in
System Federation No. 59 of Railway Employees' Department of A. F. of L.
v. Louisiana & A. Ry. Co., 57 F. Supp. 151 (D. C. La. 1944), where the sole
heir of a former railroad employee brought suit to enforce an award of the
National Railroad Adjustment Board, and the court held that the right
sought to be enforced, under the substantive law of Louisiana, was personal
to the deceased employee. Apparently, plaintiff made an effort to throw the
case under the rule of Castelluccio v. Cloverland Dairy Products Co., 165 La.
606, 115 So. 796 (1928) by analogizing the award by the National Railroad
Adjustment to plaintiff's intestate to a judgment, but the court held that
such an award was too vague as to be incapable of enforcement. A remote
possibility exists that the 1946 legislation may have been sponsored by or-
ganized labor in an effort to overthrow what it felt to be the unsatisfactory
result of the federal case.
8. Defined to be obligations which "none but the obligee can enforce the
performance, or when it can be enforced only against the obligor." Art. 1997,
La. Civil Code of 1870. One illustration of the "strictly personal obligation"
given by the Civil Code is the annuity. Art. 2004, La. Civil Code of 1870. A
much more common one is usufruct. Art. 607, La. Civil Code of 1870. Since
the substantive right would terminate upon the death of the obligor or obli-
gee, even if judicially recognized by judgment, the courts should experience
no difficulty in concluding that the 1946 statute was not intended to convert
strictly personal obligations into heritable ones.
9. Such as the plaintiff's right to the custody of children, Succession of
Deshotels, 144 La. 580, 80 So. 883 (1919); or his right to be appointed admin-
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line circumstances, the applicability of the statute may present
extremely close cases.'0
Two rules of statutory construction are provided by the 1946
act, the first requiring that no prior statute be construed as an
exception to the rule announced, and the second to the effect that
no future legislation shall be interperted as embodying an ex-
ception to the prohibition against abatement unless specially and
specifically so provided. The 1946 statute differs slightly from
its code counterpart. The latter's prohibition against abatement
applies "after answer filed"; while the statutory inhibition be-
comes effective "after issue joined." In this respect, the 1946 act
is somewhat broader in application than the pertinent article of
the Code of Practice. 11
istrator, executor, tutor or curator, Succession of Coco, 183 La. 517, 164 So.
326 (1935).
10. As would be presented by the death of plaintiff after issue joined in
a suit filed by a surviving wife without issue of the marriage to recover the
"widow's homestead" allowed by Art. 3252, La. Civil Code of 1870, as amended,
or to recover the marital fourth under Art. 2382, La. Civil Code of 1870, as
amended. Both of these rights, allowed by code provisions which have been
recognized as being in pari materia, are recognized as personal rights which
ordinarily are not transmitted to the surviving spouse's heirs. Comment
(1943) 18 Tulane L. Rev. 290, 298. It has been held that the widow's claim to
the $1,000 allowance is not transmitted to her major heirs upon her death,
even if her claim had been previously reduced to judgment [Succession of
Tugwell, 43 La. Ann. 879, 9 So. 499 (1891)]; and while there is a possibility
that presently it might be held that such a judgment is a property right
transmissible to plaintiff's heirs [Castelluccio v. Cloverland Dairy Products
Co., 165 La. 606, 115 So. 796 (1928)], there seemed little doubt but that prior
to 1946 an action therefor would have been held abated by plaintiff's death
if the claim had not been reduced to judgment. In Succession of Piffet, 39
La. Ann. 556, 2 So. 210 (1887) it was held that if the surviving spouse had
judicially demanded the marital fourth prior to his death, his rights were
transmitted to his heirs by inheritance. The rationale of this case, trans-
mission by inheritance, was overturned in Succession of Justus, 44 La. Ann.
721, 11 So. 95 (1892); but strangely enough the Piffet case itself was not over-
ruled, but approved to the extent of having its facts distinguished from those
in Succession of Justus. See also Succession of Andrus, 187 La. 931, 935, 175
So. 624, 625 (1937).
Hence, the applicability of the 1946 statute may be drawn in question
when a plaintiff dies after issue joined in an action to recover the widow's
homestead, and possibly in an action to 'recover the marital fourth. In the
Chivers case, Succession of Tugwell was relied on because of the recognized
analogies of the respective points presented. No aid is afforded by the ar-
gument that the 1946 act is procedural, and there was no legislative intent
to overturn rules of substantive law. The difficulty is that the recent act can
be given no effect whatsoever without resultant modification of substantive
rules. In view of the all-inclusive language of the 1946 statute, where will
the courts draw the line?
11 Under ordinary process, the cause is at issue: (1) when the de-
fendant has answered, Art. 357, La. Code of Practice of 1870; (2) when a
dilatory exception (properly speaking) has been filed, Art. 357, La. Code of
Practice of 1870; Diamond T. Motor Trucks v. Heck, 13 So.(2d) 512 (La.
App. 1943); see Self v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 178 La. 240, 251, 151
So. 193, 196 (1933); (3) by the taking of a default, Art. 360, La. Code of Prac-
tice of 1870; and (4) by participating in the trial without objection, where
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Judicial Sales. Louisiana Act 74 of 1946 amends two articles
of the Code of Practice 12 so as to provide more definite rules for
the appointment of the two appraisers to value the property to
be sold,13 to fix the fees thereof,"4 and in the event of a disagree-
ment as to values to permit the officer conducting the sale to
appoint a third appraiser whose decision shall be final. 5
Jactitory Actions. In these actions, also known as actions of
slander of title, "The defendant may deny the possession [of
plaintiff]; or he may deny the slander, thereby waiving title;
or he may admit the slander and claim title in himself, in which
event the action is converted into a petitory one, with the de-
fendant sustaining the burden of affirmative proof of his alleged
title, as a plaintiff."16 The issue of plaintiff's lack of a requisite
possession might have been raised in several ways. If there was
a deficiency of allegation in the petition, it might have been
tendered through the exception of want of possession,1 or by
exceptions of no right and no cause of action,18 and disposed of
preliminarily by a trial of the exceptions."0 If the allegations of
the petition were sufficient on this point, theoretically the issue
of plaintiff's possession might be presented by the exception of
want of possession; but as a practical matter, no advantage was
gained by defendant thereby, as the courts would not try the
factual issue presented by the exception preliminarily, but would
there has been no express joinder of issue or taking of a default, Ducote v.
Ducote, 183 La. 886, 165 So. 133 (1935). Issue is not joined by the filing of a
declinatory exception. Art. 358, La. Code of Practice of 1870; Self v. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., supra.
12. Arts. 671 and 674, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
13. By amendment of Art. 671, La. Code of Practice of 1870, the written
notice to be served upon the parties to appoint an appraiser is broadened
so that it may be served upon the party, his counsel or an attorney ap-
pointed by the court to represent him. The time for serving such notice is
shortened from ten days prior to the sale to three days (exclusive of holi-
days).
14. The fees of the appraisers are to be fixed by the cfficer conducting
the sale at not less than $4.00 nor more than $10.00. A larger fee may be
fixed by the court after a hearing, or may be paid if agreed to in writing
by all litigants. Art. 671, La. Code of Practice of 1870, as amended by La.
Act 74 of 1946.
15. Art. 674, La. Code of Practice of 1870, as amended by La. Act 74 of
1946. Prior to such amendment, the code provision required the appoint-
ment of an umpire by the appraisers, or by the sheriff if they could not
agree on a selection.
16. Comment (1938) 12 Tulane L. Rev. 254, 256 (1938).
17. Dalton v. Wickliffe, 35 La. Ann. 355 (1883).
18. Craig v. Lambert, 44 La. Ann. 885, 11 So. 464 (1892); Coleman v.
Bradford, 23 So.(2d) 818 (La. App. 1945). See also Williams' Heirs v. Zengel,
117 La. 599, 608, 42 So. 153, 155-156 (1906).
19. Dalton v. Wickliffe, 35 La. Ann. 355 (1883); Coleman v. Bradford, 23
So.(2d) 818 (La. App. 1945).
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refer the exception to the trial on the merits.2 0 Usually, the issue
of plaintiff's possession was raised through the answer's denial
of plaintiff's allegations, and disposed of at the trial of the case
on its merits. 21
Act 241 of 1946 modifies this procedure by requiring that
the issue of plaintiff's possession (whether in fact or as a result
of deficiency of the petition's allegations) be raised by an excep-
tion filed in limine litis; and providing that, unless so presented,
such defense will be waired upon joinder of issue. Nowhere does
the statute expressly require that this exception be tried prelim-
inarily, rather than referred to the merits, but such a practice
would seem definitely in accord with the general legislative in-
tent. If so, the effect of this statute should prove conducive to a
more expeditious and orderly prosecution of jactitory actions.
If the exception of want of possession is maintained, it terminates
the suit; if overruled, in the great majority of cases the defend-
ant will assert title in his answer, thus immediately converting
the case into a petitory action.
Private Sale of Minor's or Interdict's Property. Act 209 of
1932 provides the procedure for selling property, or the undi-
vided interest therein, owned by a minor or interdict. Section 7
thereof, expressly limited to cases where property in which a
minor or interdict had an interest was to be sold to effect a par-
tition, afforded machinery for the appointment of a tutor or cu-
rator for a minor or interdict not having such representative,
20. Dalton v. Wickliffe, 35 La. Ann. 355 (1883); Craig v. Lambert, 44 La.
Ann. 885, 11 So. 464 (1892); Williams' Heirs v. Zengel, 117 La. 599, 42 So. 153
(1906); Labarre v. Burton-Swartz Cypress Co., 126 La. 982, 53 So. 113 (1910).
In Arrowsmith v. Durell, 14 La. Ann. 849 (1859), the factual issues raised by
the exception were tried preliminarily; but in Dalton v. Wickliffe, 35 La.
Ann. 355, 356, the court refused to accept the case as precedent, holding that
the exceptions were tried irregularly without objection by plaintiff.
21. In such cases if plaintiff fails to show the requisite possession, the
suit is dismissed. Patterson v. Landry, 112 La. 1069, 36 So. 857 (1904); South
Louisiana Land Co. v. Riggs Cypress Co., 119 La. 193, 43 So. 1003 (1907);
Labarre v. Burton-Swartz Cypress Co., 126 La. 982, 53 So. 113 (1910); Com-
ment (1938) 12 Tulane L. Rev. 254, 259. If the answer tenders the sole issue
of plaintiff's possession, and the proof establishes the latter, the judgment
quiets plaintiff in his possession and orders defendant to bring suit in re-
vendication within a delay fixed by the court. Riley v. Kaempfer, 175 So.
884 (La. App. 1937); Comment (1938) 12 Tulane L. Rev. 254, 259. See Siegel
v. Hells, 186 La. 506, 172 So. 768 (1937). The same type of judgment is rend-
ered if defendant fails to answer and default judgment is taken against
him. Siegel v. Hel4s, supra. A more streamlined procedure Is sanctioned
by Sherburne v. Iberville Land Co., 192 La. 1091, 190 So. 227 (1939), holding
that after judgment on the issue of plaintiff's possession, defendant might
still convert the action into a petitory one by asserting title in a supple-
mental answer, and was not obliged to present its action in revendication
in a separate suit.
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without the necessity of convoking a family meeting to make
appropriate recommendations.
Louisiana Act 71 of 1946 amends and re-enacts this Section
7 of the 1932 statute. Two changes are effected by the amenda-
tory legislation. First, the section is broadened so as to make its
provisions applicable to any prospective sale, whether sought to
be made to effect a partition "or for any other purpose. '2 Second,
the amendment provides that any foreign guardian of the minor
or interdict, properly recognized by the Louisiana courts,28 may
represent the incompetent.
It is by no means certain that this amendatory legislation
was necessary, as the probabilities are that the same results could
have been obtained under then existing statutes.24 However, the
express provisions of the amendatory legislation go far toward
removing in certain cases even the slight risk which title attor-
neys cannot afford to take.
CONSERVATION
In General
Act 137 of 1946. The State Soil Conservation Committee'
was voted an appropriation of a quarter of a million dollars for
the purchase of machinery and equipment to assist the various
conservation districts in the work of soil conservation and ero-
sion control, in co-operation with the United States Department
of Agriculture and other federal agencies.
22. The procedure sanctioned by La. Act 209 of 1932, § 1 [Dart's Stats.(1939)
H§ 4844-4847.5] is available not only for sales made to effect a partition, but
is applicable to all sales which appear to the tutor or curator to be "to the
advantage of the minor or interdict." Cf. Cormier v. Thibodeaux, 20 So.(2d)
621, 623 (La. App. 1945), where the question was presented with respect to
La. Act 77 of 1928, the majority of which was repealed by the 1932 statute.
However, the appointment of a tutor or curator could be made under the
provisions of Section 7 only when the sale was to be made to effect a par-
tition.
23. Under Art. 363, La. Civil Code of 1870, as amended by La. Act 251 of
1920; Art. 415, La. Civil Code of 1870; In the Matter of the Interdiction of
Parker, 39 La. Ann. 333, 1 So. 891 (1887). The 1932 statute, even as thus
amended, is not complete, as no provision Is made for the appointment of
an undertutor or undercurator, and La. Act 47 of 1932, § 2 [Dart's Stats. §
4854.2] would have to be utilized.
24. Regardless of the reason for the sale, the tutor or curator might
have been appointed under La. Act 47 of 1934, § 2 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4854.2],
and the property might have been sold under the other sections of the 1934
statute. With respect to the foreign guardian acting as tutor or curator, It
appears reasonably certain that the same results could have been obtained
under- the provision of the 1934 statute just cited and Articles 363 and 415 of
the Civil Code.
1. La. Act 370 of 1938 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 57.7 et seq.].
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Mines and finerals
Act 338 of 1946. Under the provisions of Act 162 of 19402 all
state agencies as defined therein 8 were authorized to lease for
mineral purposes through the State Mineral Board any lands be-
longing to them. Section 4 of the act relative to the leasing of
Sixteenth Section lands belonging to school boards, provided
that all funds realized from such leases should be paid to the
school boards of the parishes wherein such lands were situated
and credited to the current school fund of the parish. As amended
by this act, the section in question permits the leasing of lands,
exclusive of Sixteenth Section lands, granted to any particular
school board, but it is further provided that the funds realized
from such leases are to be paid to the board holding title to the
land, to be credited to a special fund and applied to the uses and
purposes for which the grant was made. So that, where a par-
ticular school board has acquired property for a particular pur-
pose, it may grant mineral leases thereon, provided the proceeds
thereof are used for the particular purposes for which the land
was originally acquired.
Act 370 of 1946. Act 93 of 19364 created the State Mineral
Board composed of the governor and four other members to be
appointed by him, with authority to lease, for mineral purposes,
lands belonging to the state and political subdivisions thereof.
Under Section 7 of the act,5 the minimum of royalties to be stipu-
lated in any such leases was fixed at one-eighth of all oil and gas
produced, seventy-five cents for each long ton on sulphur, ten
cents per ton on potash and one-eighth on all other minerals
produced. Ten per cent of the minimum royalties provided for
and received from such leases was required to be placed into a
special road fund to be accumulated and withdrawn by the De-
partment of Highways exclusively for the building of concrete
roads and bridges in the parishes in which the lands leased were
situated. The 1946 act merely amends this section to authorize
the department to construct not only concrete roads and bridges
but also black top and other hardsurfaced roads.
2. La. Act 162 of 1940, § 4 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 4728.4].
3. State agencies defined in the act include: Levee, drainage, road, and
school districts, school boards, commissions, parishes, municipalities, state
universities and colleges, and penal or eleemosynary institutions.
4. La. Act 93 of 1936 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4725.1 et seq.].
5. La. Act 93 of 1936, § 7, as last amended by La. Act 92 of 1940 [Dart's
Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 4725.7].
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Wild Birds and Game Quadrupeds
Acts 22, 332, and 284 of 1946. The statute regulating the tak-
ing of wild birds and game quadrupedse has been amended by
these acts. The open season for deer hunting has been changed
from November 15th to January 1st, to November 1st to January
10th;7 foxes are now included in the definition of "outlawed" ani-
mals;8 the price of hunting licenses for residents has been in-
creased to two dollars," and for non-residents to twenty-five dol-
lars.'0 Besides the foregoing, some innovations of relative im-
portance have been added. In order to facilitate the enforcement
of the provisions making it unlawful for any one to have in his
possession any game after the close of the open season, it is now
required that the operators of cold storage plants wherein the
game might be stored make a report. This report must be made
within ten days from the storing and must set forth the number
of birds or other game stored and the names of the persons stor-
ing them." Also, new penalties, and a new procedure for the en-
forcement thereof, have been substituted. Formerly, the act pro-
vided for a fine of from twenty-five to five hundred dollars or
imprisonment for not more than six months or both. The act
now provides for a civil suit in the name of the people, by the
Commissioner of Wild Life and Fisheries, for the recovery of a
penalty of twerty-five dollars for the first offense, one hundred
dollars for the second, and two hundred dollars for the third of-
fense with revocation of license. The act further confers jurisdic-
tion on justice of the peace courts, as well as on municipal and
district courts in the parish where the "offense is committed" to
enforce the penalty provisions, and provides that the suit may
be brought in any court having jurisdictional amount, regardless
of the domicile of the defendant. Furthermore, the defendant is
not permitted to except to the venue, unless he declares in what
parish the alleged violation was committed.
Manifestly, the suit to enforce the penalty provisions is
criminal in nature, and it may be objected, at least, that the sta-
tute attempts to confer jurisdiction on justice of the peace courts,
in violation of the constitution. 2
6. La. Act 273 of 1926 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2925 et seq.].
7. La. Act 284 of 1946.
8. La. Act 332 of 1946.
9. La. Act 22 of 1946.
10. La. Act 332 of 1946.
11. La. Act 273 of 1926, Art. II, §§ 5, 6, as amended by La. Act 332 of 1946.
12. La. Code of Practice of 1870, Art. 9, defines a civil action as one
which is brought for private purposes. "The term 'civil action' embraces
1946]
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Fish and other Aquatic Life
Acts 67, 107, and 108 of 1946. A statute of 193613 prohibited
the seining of fish for commercial purposes in Lake Providence;
still another prohibited commercial fishing altogether." The re-
strictions against seining have been lifted by Act 67; and the
statute closing the lake to all commercial fishing has been re-
pealed by Act 108 of 1946. On the other hand, Lake Bruen, in
which seining for commercial purposes was already prohibited, 15
has been closed altogether by Act 107 of 1946. The Department
of Wild Life and Fisheries is charged with the enforcement of
the statute, and violations are punishable by fine or imprison-
ment or both.
Act 118 of 1946. The use of seines, nets or webbing for fish-
from its natural import, every species of 'suit' not of a criminal kind, and
comprehends every conceivable cause of action, whether legal or equitable,
except such as are 'criminal' in the sense that the judgment may be a fine
or imprisonment .. " Gillson v. Vendome Petroleum Corporation, 35 F.
Supp. 815, 819 (D. C. La. 1940). La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 48, confers
criminal jurisdiction on justices of the peace as committing magistrates
only, and the legislature is prohibited from conferring them with jurisdic-
tion in the trial of criminal offenses and misdemeanors. State v. Mackles,
161 La. 187, 108 So. 410 (1926).
In this connection, it must be observed that Act 408 of 1946 proposes a
constitutional amendment to be submitted to the electorate in November,
1946, which, if adopted will confer on justices of the peace, concurrent crimi-
nal jurisdiction with district courts of all misdemeanors involving violations
of the conservation laws regarding the taking of fish and game resources
of the state. But it must be noted that the proposed amendment does not
contain any reference whatsoever to the legislation conferring jurisdiction
on these courts, nor do the particular statutes contain a reference to the
proposed amendment. Under the jurisprudence as it existed prior to the
adoption of Article 21, § 2, of the Constitution of 1921, it was well settled
that an act which, at the time of its passage is null and void, cannot
be given validity and effect by the adoption of a new constitution, or
a constitutional amendment, unless the amendment clearly shows that
it is to have a retrospective effect, or unless it confirms or ratifies the
prior legislation. Etchison Drilling Co. v. Flournoy, 131 La. 442, 59 So. 867
(1912). Article 21, § 2, of the Constitution of 1921 provides that whenever the
legislature submits amendments to the constitution, it may, at the same ses-
sion, pass laws to carry them into effect to become operative when the pro-
posed amendments have been ratified. Whether or not the above article of the
Constitution makes it unnecessary for the legislation to refer to the amend-
ment, or vice versa is doubtful. The article merely empowers the legislature to
enact enabling legislation to become operative upon adoption of the amend-
ment, but it would appear that the requirement that this intention be
clearly expressed is still necessary. Peck v. City of New Orleans. 199 La.
76, 5 So. (2d) 508 (1941).
However, whether or not these provisions in the statute are constitu-
tional seems to be immaterial, since upon the adoption of the amendment
the courts will have been vested with jurisdiction, and any subsequent ac-
tions brought will be automatically sanctioned, the proposed amendment
being from its very nature self operative.
13. La. Act 197 of 1936 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 3041.41.
14. La. Act 303 of 1938 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 3041.8].
15. La. Act 197 of 1936 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 3041.4].
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ing in Bogue Chitto River is now prohibited by this act. Viola-
tions are declared to be misdemeanors punishable by a fine of
twenty-five dollars or imprisonment for not more than sixty days
for the first offense, fifty dollars and/or ninety days for each
subsequent offense.
Acts 96, 97, and 382 of 1946. Two new fish preserves were
created at this past session of the legislature. The Department
of Wild Life and Fisheries was authorized to acquire the waters
known as Horseshoe Brake and Horseshoe Lake, both in the
Parish of Morehouse, for the purposes of establishing preserves
there."0 In addition, the act creating the Bayou Pierre fish pre-
serve has been amended so as to increase the members of the
commission governing it from three to nine.7
Act 120 of 1946. The statute creating the Northwest Lou-
isiana Game and Fish Preserve was amended to provide for the
creation of a commission to be domiciled in the Parish of Natchi-
toches, composed of three members to be appointed by the gover-
nor. The commission is to operate under the Department of Wild
Life and Fisheries and it has the authority to promulgate rules
and regulations for the control of the preserve.
Act 87 of 1946. Closed seasons in certain enumerated par-
ishes for the fishing of black bass, striped bass or crapie were
established by the "fish law" of 1942.19 This provision has been
deleted by this act, but at the same time it confers authority on
the Commissioner of Wild Life and Fisheries to declare closed
seasons on all species of fish in any waters throughout the state,
upon evidence that the fish is being depleted through overfishing
and that such fishing is detrimental to the interests of the state.
Acts 78, 196 and 210 of 1946. The "fish law" was further
amended as follows: the limit on striped bass and bar fish has
been increased from fifteen to twenty-five; 20 all netting and tackle
used for fresh and salt water commercial fishing must now be
tagged by the Department of Wild Life and Fisheries, and failure
to have it properly tagged is presumptive evidence of the illegal
use thereof;2 1 in addition to the prohibition against commercial
fishing with spears, poisons or explosives, it is now unlawful to
16. La. Acts 96, 97 of 1946.
17. La. Act 382 of 1946.
18. La. Act 191 of 1926 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 3168 et seq.]
19. La. Act 145 of 1942, § 8, as last amended by La. Act 166 of 1944 [Dart's
Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 3009].
20. La. Act 145 of 1942, § 14, as amended by La. Act 196 of 1946.
21. Id. at H 17 and 18.
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fish with guns, bows and arrows or traps;22 wholesale and retail
dealers, as well as consumers of frogs must dispose of any frogs
in their possession within ten days after the close of the open
season; 28 nonresident licenses were raised from five to ten dol-
lars, with no provision being made for "tourist" licenses which
were good for four days and cost two dollars.2
But perhaps the most significant amendments to this statute
are the provisions imposing restrictions on commercial fishing
as follows: For all vessels engaged in commercial salt water
fishing, or in buying or transporting fish, a license must be pro-
cured, and all vessels so licensed are preshmed to be used ex-
clusively in Louisiana and in Louisiana waters and are deemed
to be taking salt water fish solely in the waters of Louisiana.
All fish taken are conclusively presumed to have been taken in
Louisiana, on which the state severance tax must be paid. Should
the owner of a licensed vessel desire to fish outside Louisiana
waters he must so notify the Department of Wild Life and Fish-
eries, whereupon his license is to be suspended not to be reissued
for the rest of the year. Furthermore, no vessel is to be licensed
unless its owner is a citizen of the state and a resident thereof
for the preceding two years, and unless the vessel itself is reg-
istered as a Louisiana vessel. An exception is made, however, in
the case of nonresidents who are citizens of a state with which
a reciprocal agreement has been entered into.2 5 Provisions are
made for the seizure of vessels and other vehicles used in taking
or transporting fish taken in violation of the statute, and penalties
are provided for the recovery of which a "civil suit" to be insti-
tuted in the name of the people of the state by the Commissioner
of Wild Life and Fisheries is authorized, the suit to be brought
before justice of the peace courts, municipal or district courts of
the parish where the offense is committed. District courts in
parishes bordering the Gulf of Mexico are vested with jurisdic-
tion to try cases arising from violations occurring in the coastal
waters of the state.
2 6
22. Id. at § 19.
23. Id. at § 22.
24. Id. at § 25.
25. Id. at § 26.
26. In this connection it is to be noted that 411 of 1946 is a proposed
constitutional amendment to be submitted to the electorate in November,
which if adopted will invest the different district courts in all parishes
bordering in the Gulf of Mexico concurrent jurisdiction to enforce the sta-
tutes regulating fish and game laws, where the violation occurs in the Gulf,
within the territorial waters of the state. By Act 409 of 1946, also, a proposed
amendment would invest district courts with appellate jurisdiction on ap-
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These provisions are also found in Act 78 of 1946, amending
the statute regulating the taking, processing, transportation and
sale of shrimp.
There is no doubt but that the statutes are discriminatory
against nonresidents, but as to whether the discrimination is
valid is only one of several questions which are at once apparent
and which in themselves afford sufficient material to warrant
independent treatment. At best only a brief analysis of some of
the questions involved can be made within the space and time
limitations available.
There is no question but that the state may, as owner of all
natural resources within its borders, regulate the fisheries and
fishing industry in the state,7 and that it may keep, for the use
of its citizens, all the fish taken therein, and even withdraw it
from the channels of interstate commerce.2 8 Nonresidents there-
fore may be denied altogether the right to fish within the waters
of the state, which may even regulate the taking of fish beyond
its territorial waters when such taking interferes or injuriously
affects the supply within its borders.2 9 Generally, however, a
state may not extend the operation of its laws beyond its juris-
dictional limits,3" and it would seem an undue extension of the
state's power to regulate fishing beyond its territorial waters, if
the statute is sought to apply to persons fishing beyond such
waters, simply because they have secured a Louisiana license to
fish.3 1
Whether the provisions establishing a conclusive presump-
tion that all Louisiana licensed vessels are engaged in Louisiana
waters and that all fish and shrimp taken are taken from the
territorial waters of Louisiana is a valid exercise of the regu-
latory power of the state is doubtful. Due process requires that
the offender be permitted a fair opportunity to repel presump-
tions against .him, and statutes which restrict the character of
the proof by which the presumption can be rebutted are held
violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
peals from justice of the peace courts involving violations of the conserva-
tion laws pertaining to fish and game.
27. State v. Monteleone, 171 La. 438, 131 So. 291 (1930); Vail v. Seaborg,
120 Wash. 126, 207 Pac. 15 (1922).
28. Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U. S. 1, 49 S. Ct. 1, 73 L.
Ed. 147 (1928).
29. Mirkowich v. Minor, 34 F. Supp. 409 (D. C. Cal. 1940); Santa Cruz
Oil Corporation v. Milnor, 130 P. (2d) 256 (Cal. App. 1942). Cf. Abe
v. Fish and Game Commission, 9 Cal. App. (2d) 300, 49 P. (2d) 608 (1935).
30. Santa Cruz Oil Corporation v. Milnor, 130 P. (2d) 256 (Cal. App. 1942).
31. Ibid.
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ment8 2 Even more so would be a statute which would deny al-
together any proof against the presumption. Another question
that necessarily arises is as to the grant of jurisdiction on justice
of the peace courts to enforce the penalty provisions of the sta-
tute. As heretofore pointed out, similar provisions are contained
in the amendment to the wild birds and game statute, and what
is there said is applicable here also.33
As it has been pointed out already, residents of reciprocal
states are permitted to be licensed in Louisiana, and, under Act
210 of 1946, they will be subjected to the same rules and regula-
tions and will be licensed under the same terms as Louisiana
citizens.
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
Thirty-one proposed constitutional amendments were adopted
by the legislature during the regular session of 1946. These
will be submitted to the electorate for ratification at the regular
election to be held November 5, 1946.
Several of these amendments were included in the discus-
sions under the various topics in the foregoing, and only a brief
summary of the remaining will be included in the paragraphs
that follow. For the purpose of this r~sum6, topic classifications,
rather than numerical order, has been followed.
Bond Issues
Act 393 of 1946 proposes an amendment to Article VI, Sec-
tion 22, of the Constitution of 1921, by adding a new paragraph
authorizing the funding into bonds, the proceeds of the four cents
tax on gasoline, benzine, naphtha and other motor fuels, to pro-
vide funds for the construction, maintenance, and improvement
of highways.
Act 414 of 1946 is also a proposal which would authorize the
Board of Liquidation to fund into bonds of the state any surplus
of the tax of three-fourths of a mill on the dollar on the taxable
property in the state, in order to acquire sufficient funds for the
construction and maintenance of the Confederate Memorial Medi-
cal Center at Shreveport.
32. McFarland v. American Sugar Ref. Co. 241 U. S. 79, 36 S. Ct. 498, 60
L. Ed. 899 (1916); Manley v. Georgia, 279 U. S. 1, 49 S. Ct. 215, 73 L. Ed. 575
(1928); State v. Elkin, 177 La. 427, 148 So. 668 (1933); Walter v. State, 208
Ind. 231, 195 N. E. 268 (1935). See also State v. Donato, 127 La. 393, 53 So.
662 (1910).
33. See p. 43, n. 12.
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Courts
Article VIII, Section 53, of the Constitution of 1921, relative
to the juvenile courts, provides that the expenses of these courts
should be paid by "the respective parishes in which each exer-
cises its jurisdiction." An amendment proposing that these ex-
penses be now paid in such a manner as the legislature deems
proper has been proposed.1
Drainage and Levee Districts
A proposition to amend Article XIV, Section 35, of the Con-
stitution of 1921 would authorize the Fourth Jefferson Drainage
District to issue bonds secured by ad valorem taxation for the
purpose of constructing drainage works within the district.2
By another amendment, the Board of Commissioners of the
Ponchartrain Levee District would be required to construct
levees on the shore of Lake Ponchartrain from the intersection
of the Orleans and Jefferson Parish line to the east end of the
Bonnet Carre Spillway. Authority to raise the necessary funds
through bond issues is also included.
Forestry
Under Act 399 of 1946, which proposes an amendment to
Article VI, Section 2, of the Constitution, the legislature would
have authority to empower the different parishes to levy an acre-
age tax, not to exceed two cents per acre, to promote the practice
of forestry. The homestead exemption provided by Article X,
Section 4, of the Constitution is extended and made applicable
to this tax.
Mines and Minerals
If Act 416 of 1946 which proposes an amendment to Article
IV of the Constitution is ratified, all revenues and royalties de-
rived from minerals extracted from points beyond the three mile
limit in the coastal waters will be payable into the state treasury
as being the property of the state, and dedicated to retire the
bonded indebtedness.
1. La. Act 391 of 1946.
2. La. Act 397 of 1946. Enabling legislation to become operative on the
ratification of this proposed amendment was also enacted. See La. Act 55
of 1946.
3. La. Act 398 of 1946, proposing an amendment to Art. XVI, § 8, La.
Const. of 1921.
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Municipalities and Parishes
Act 386 of 1946 is a proposal to permit the legislature to au-
thorize the different parishes to assume the debts of road, drain-
age, irrigation, levee and school districts located within the par-
ishes. When these districts are located in more than one parish,
authority to assume the proportionate share of their debts will
also be conferred.4
By Act 389 of 1946, it is proposed to add a new section to
Article XIV of the Constitution, whereby the Parish of East
Baton Rouge will have power to adopt, in the manner provided,
plans for the self-government of the parish, as well as for the
several municipalities within the parish.
The proposed amendment to Article XIV, Section 14, of the
Constitution will authorize the legislature to confer upon paro-
chial and municipal corporations authority to acquire, subject
to the approval of the Board of Commerce and the State Bond
and Tax Board, property for the establishment of commercial
and industrial enterprises in order to provide employment during
the period of readjustment from a wartime to a peacetime eco-
nomy. For this purpose, the necessary authority to incur debt,
issue bonds, and levy special taxes may also be conferred.,
The Community Center and Playground Districts, created
by Act 285 of 1946, would, on the adoption of Act 403 of 1946 as a
constitutional amendment, have authority to incur debt to a suf-
ficient amount to acquire lands and purchase or construct the
necessary facilities for the establishment of parks, playgrounds
and recreation centers."
Another amendment which would be self operative would
authorize the Parish of Jefferson to establish commercial, resi-
dential and industrial districts within the parish.1
New Basin Canal and Shell Road
Authority would be granted to the Board of Control of the
New Basin Canal and Shell Road, under an amendment proposed
by Act 405 of 1946, to sell to the City of New Orleans certain por-
tions of the canal and road property for the construction of the
4. La. Act 386 of 1946, proposed an amendment to La. Const. of 1921,
Art. XIV, § 14(k).
5. La. Act 400 of 1946.
6. La. Act 285 of 1946, which created these districts, does not include in
the powers granted the authority to incur debt or issue bonds.
7. La. Act 404 of 1946, proposing an amendment to La. Const. of 1921,
Art. XIV, by adding a new section thereto.
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proposed Union Railroad Passenger Terminal. The City of New
Orleans would likewise have the authority to enter into contracts
with the proper companies under such terms and conditions as
are specified in the amendment for the erection and maintenance
of the terminal station.
Revenue and Taxation
An additional five thousand dollars homestead exemption
from state, parish and special taxes would become effective in
favor of honorably discharged veterans of World War II, upon
the ratification of the proposed amendment contained in Act
412 of 1946. This is limited, however, to the five years beginning
in 1947, and ending with and including the year 1951.
Article VI-A, Section 14, of the Constitution of 1921, which
imposes a one cent tax on gasoline and other motor fuels, is to be
amended by Act 413 of 1946 so as to exempt from the tax gaso-
line sold to the armed forces of the United States and gasoline
sold to the Federal Government in lots of six thousand gallons
or more.
A proposal to amend Article X, Section 4, of the Constitu-
tion would authorize the Department of Commerce and Industry
to exempt from taxation any new manufacturing establishments,
pursuant to contracts entered into with the owners thereof.8
Also exempted from all ad valorem taxes for a period of ten
years would be aircraft based or operating in the state, as well as
hangers, machine shops and other equipment used in connection
therewith, provided the proposed amendment to Article X, Sec-
tion 4, is ratified at the next general election in November.9
Suits against the State
As previously stated, Act 385 of 1946 proposes an amendment
to Article III, Section 35 of the Constitution, which would require
the legislature to adopt a uniform pattern when enacting legis-
lation authorizing suits against the state. The legislature would
be required to designate the court in which the suit is to be
brought and the persons on whom citation is to be served. Other-
wise, the procedure is to be the same as in suits between private
litigants, except that money judgments will be satisfied only
out of monies specially appropriated by the legislature.
Also as previously pointed out, this proposed amendment is
8. La Act 401 of 1946.
9. La. Act 402 of 1946.
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nothing more than a legislative recognition of the usual practice
heretofore observed by the law makers, prevalent in the majority
of other states, of enacting legislation granting permission to
sue the state.
This practice of adopting special laws authorizing suits in
individual instances is, no doubt, the result of the unwillingness
of the legislature to abrogate in its entirety the doctrine of state
immunity, which apparently is still a widely accepted principle.,
However, the disadvantages, both to the individual claimants and
to the legislators, which such methods entail, outweigh by far
the principles underlying such procedure. To mention but a few,
an unduly long period of time must necessarily elapse before final
settlement can be made, for it is only during the legislative ses-
sion, which normally covers but sixty days each biennium, that
claims may be presented for adjustment. The volume of individ-
ual petitions for relief presented to the legislature at each session
must certainly entail a waste of time and effort on committee
members appointed to hear and determine the merits of each
particular claim. Then again, the fundamental objection is the
exercise of judicial functions by committee legislators in recom-
mending claims for legislative action.
While proposing a uniform method to be followed in insti-
tuting suits against the state, the legislature might well have
provided for a system such as has been adopted in other juris-
dictions, following the example of the federal government, in
creating special courts of claims.
In New York, a state court of claims is composed of five
judges appointed by the governor with jurisdiction to determine
claims against the state both on contract and tort, the procedure
being similar to that in ordinary civil actions." Of course, this
entails an absolute waiver of the state's immunity to suit, but on
the other hand, the practical difficulties outlined are thereby
avoided. 12
COURTS AND COURT OFFICERS
Of particular importance in connection with the legislation
relative to the various courts are the statute creating an addi-
10. The doctrine of sovereign immunity to suit in tort has been subjected
to serious criticism. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (1924) 34
Yale L.J. 1.
11. Thompson's Laws of New York (1940) 922, Art. II.
12. For a full discussion of the various methods adopted by the different
states in settling claims against them, see The Book of the States (1943-
1944) 299.
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tional judgeship for the Parish of East Baton Rouge1 and the act
abolishing the offices of justice of the peace and constable in the
First Ward of Acadia Parish, creating in their stead the City
Court of Rayne.2
In addition, the legislature created the office of Assistant
District Attorney, carrying a salary of fifteen hundred dollars
per annum for the Parishes of Bossier and Webster;" authorized
the appointment of a court reporter for each judge of the four-
teenth judicial district; 4 provided for the appointment of a court
stenographer in the seventeenth judicial district,5 and authorized
each of the judges of the courts of appeal throughout the state
to appoint law clerks, stenographers and such other clerical help
necessary for the proper operation and administration of their
courts.6
For the purposes of nomination and election, the various
district courts throughout the state (the Parish of Orleans ex-
cepted) are divided into divisions, where there are two or more
elective judges, and each candidate is now required to state, at
the time of filing his declaration, for what division he intends
to become a candidate.7
In addition to all other qualifications now required by law,
Act 273 of 1946 now provides that the judge of the City Court of
Jennings must be a qualified attorney duly admitted to the bar
and licensed to practice law in the courts of the state.
Particularly affecting the judges of the several district courts
(the Parish of Orleans excepted) was Act 230 of 1946, whereby
the legislature authorized the reimbursement to them of all fu-
ture expenses, up to fifteen hundred dollars per annum, incurred
for salaries of stenographers, clerks, law books, legal periodicals
and the like, in connection with their official duties.
The act governing the general fees to be charged by the
several clerks of courts (the Parish of Orleans excepted) has
been revised upwards,8 and in the Parish of Orleans sheriffs are
1. La. Act 50 of 1946.
2. La. Act 354 of 1946.
3. La. Act 359 of 1946.
4. La. Act 229 of 1946.
5. La. Act 119 of 1946.
6. La. Act 212 of 1946. This act further repealed La. Act 193 of 1928
[Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1466] providing for the appointment of three stenog-
raphers for each of the courts of appeal, and La. Act 216 of 1920 [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 1456] providing for a per diem of $6.00,for each judge of the
courts of appeal while travelling on official duties, in view of the allowance
of 6 cents per mile granted by the 1946 statute.
7. La. Act 95 of 1946.
8. La. Act 339 of 1946.
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now authorized to charge, for the appointment of a keeper to
property, the actual amount paid by him not to exceed five dol-
lars per each twelve hours.0
But perhaps the most important acts, from a legal stand-
point, are those raising the salaries of the several judges."0 Does
the constitutional requirement that no judge shall be affected
in his term of office, salary, or jurisdiction during his term of
office" limit the power of the legislature to pass any laws in-
creasing their compensation? It must be noted that in only one
instance does the statute provide for the increase of salary to be
effective after the expiration of the terms of the present incum-
bents.' 2
The question here is not whether the legislature has the
authority to change the salaries of the judges, 18 but whether the
change can operate or affect the judges presently in office. It is
to be observed that the constitution further provides that any
legislation which affects the salaries of judges is to take effect
only at the end of the term of office of the judges to which such
legislation may apply at the time of its enactment. 14
That the constitutional provisions above referred to limits
the power of the legislature to "diminish" the salaries of judges
during their terms of office is not open to controversy. ', This was
the rule, even in the absence of a constitutional prohibition, 6 the
9. La. Act 269 of 1946.
10. These include La. Acts 153 and 187 of 1946, increasing the salaries
of the city court judges of Monroe and Shreveport; La. Acts 6, 59 and 264
of 1946 increasing the salaries of the district judges of the 1st, 4th and 9th
districts; and La. Act 24 of 1946, raising the salaries of the judges of the
courts of appeal. See supra p. 25.
11. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 40, as amended by La. Act 386 of 1940,
providing: "No elected judge of any court of the state, except as otherwise
provided In this Constitution, shall be affected in his term of office, salary,
or jurisdiction as to amount, during the term or period for which he was
elected; and any legislation so affecting any such judge or court shall take
effect only at the end of the term of office of such judge or judges, incum-
bents of the court or courts, to which such legislation may apply at the time
of its enactment ....
12. La. Act 264 of 1946, raising the salary of the district judges of the
9th judicial district.
13. See La. Const. of 1921, Art. III, § 34.
14. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 40.
15. State ex rel. Garland v. Buillory, 184 La. 329, 166 So. 94 (1935).
16. State ex rel. Moss v. Jumel, 31 La. Ann. 142 (1879). Where the organic
law prohibits the "changing" of the salaries of judges during their terms
of office, statutes raising or diminishing their salaries have been held to be
in contravention thereof: Adams v. Slavin, 225 Ky. 135, 7 S. W. (2d) 836
(1928); State v. Thatcher, 116 Ohio 113, 155 N. E. 691 (1927). Cf. People v.
City of Chicago, 360 11. 25, 195 N. E. 451 (1935) wherein the prohibition was
against either "diminishing or Increasing."
In State ex rel. Bahns v. City of New Orleans, 163 La. 777, 112 So. 718
(1927), a statute raising the salary of the city court judges for the Parish of
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theory being that the courts must be independent from the other
branches of the government. But whether the constitutional
requirement likewise limits the power of the legislature to in-
crease the compensation of judges during their terms of office
is a matter subject to inquiry and possible judicial interpretation.
The adjudicated cases by the Louisiana courts are conspicu-
ously silent on this point, the question apparently never having
been raised despite the fact that salaries of judges have been
increased from time to time (to be effective) during their terms
of office.'7
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
DALE E. BENNETT*
Amendments to Criminal Code-Placing Combustibles
The Louisiana Criminal Code of 19421 abandoned the tradi-
tional method of dividing and subdividing crimes with a special
criminal statute for each of the various ways in which a crime of
a particular type might be committed. Instead, it provided broad,
carefully drafted, general definitions of the basic offenses. For
example, the definition of theft in Article 67 eliminated previous
technical distinctions and replaced approximately one hundred
special stealing crimes whose scope and particular limitations
had been a source of much litigation and confusion. A number of
bills introduced in the 1946 legislature, which would have re-
verted to the old practice of having a special statute for each
particular way in which a crime might be committed, were re-
jected as being out of keeping with the spirit and purpose of the
Criminal Code. One amendment to the Criminal Code was
adopted. Louisiana Act 305, proposed by the Criminal Law Sec-
tion of the State Bar Association and approved by the Louisiana
State Law Institute, re-amended Article 54 of the Criminal Code
Orleans was held unconstitutional on the grounds the statute attempted to
direct payment out of the judicial expense fund. No mention, however, was
made of the constitutional provision above cited. It would seem, however,
that any change made in the salary, whether favorable or unfavorable, would
"affect" such salary as well as the judge receiving such salary.
17. Cf. La. Act 3 of 1928 (E. S.) and La. Act 24 of 1936 [Dart's Stats.
(1939) § 14291 raising the salaries of the justices of the Supreme Court from
$8,000.00 to $10,000.00 and $12,000.00 respectively; La. Act 2 of 1928 (E. S.)
[Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1454] raising salaries of the judges of courts of appeal
from $6,000.00 to $8,000.00 and La. Act 83 of 1938 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §
1516.1] increasing the salaries of district judges from $5,000.00 to $6,000.00
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Louisiana Act 43 of 1942.
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